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Law and policy initiatives to encourage the uptake of electric vehicles are examined in an 
international context. The efforts of several jurisdictions to overcome barriers to a more 
rapid uptake of electric vehicles are examined: Norway, California, Germany, New 
Zealand, Australia and France. Price support is found to be essential as long as electric 
vehicles are more expensive than internal combustion vehicles. However the impact of 
fuel efficiency standards is greater than is sometimes appreciated, especially if reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions and increasing energy security are key benefits in electric 
vehicles. Other measures are also examined. It is concluded that electric vehicle policy 
may diverge at key points from transport policy and from climate change policy. Care is 
needed to design laws and measures that will be effective from those different policy 
points of view, and that will promote social equity at the same time.  
 





Excitement about electric vehicles is understandable. They are intriguing technically. 
Compared with internal combustion vehicles, they offer impressive acceleration, fuelling 
at home, lower fuel costs, lower maintenance costs, less noise and less vibration. They are 
attractive in respect of pollution, greenhouse gas emissions, and fuel efficiency. They open 
up exciting ways of preserving the mobility that people value highly while responding to 
some of the adverse effects of transport. In the ‘first age’ of electric vehicles (EVs) in the 
late nineteenth century they were even serious competitors with internal combustion 
vehicles (ICVs), but their numbers declined as ICVs improved, petrol became cheaper, 
and long-distance road travel increased.1 The ‘second age’ began in the 1960s with 
increasing concerns about the environment and oil prices, but electric batteries did not 
improve greatly. The current ‘third age’ is driven by concerns about greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions and other pollutants, and benefits from technical advances especially 
with batteries. EVs lend themselves to the technology that is emerging to produce 
connected and autonomous vehicles. But significant barriers remain, above all price, and 
EVs have not yet entered the mass market.  
 
                                                          
1 National Research Council, Committee on Overcoming Barriers to Electric-Vehicle Deployment, 
Overcoming Barriers to Deployment of Plug-In Electric Vehicles (2015) p 8. Unless noted otherwise, in this 
article EVs are passenger on-road cars and sport utility vehicles that derive all (pure or battery EV) or some 
(plug-in hybrid EV) of their power from the electricity grid. Electrically-assisted bicycles are a whole other 




This article examines law and policy efforts to encourage the uptake of EVs. While EVs 
have significant public benefits in most situations, the benefits should not be overstated; 
electric vehicles are still vehicles, and many of the most important policy levers for EVs 
also promote improvements in the conventional vehicle fleet. The article particularly 
inquires into the extent to which divergences appear between EV policy and policy for 
transport and for climate change. It finds that those divergences are more significant than 
is generally understood, particularly in relation to fuel efficiency standards. Important 
issues appear in the social equity of policy choices, and the efficiency of different policies 
to bring about the improvements we need in transport and climate change laws and 
policies. The article provides a global overview of research knowledge about EV policy 
measures, and draws on the particular experience of several relevant jurisdictions.  
 
 
The benefits of electric vehicles; with a note of caution 
 
The public benefits that EVs offer are considerable. The overall lifecycle benefits of EVs 
in comparison with ICVs have been found to be substantial in relation to energy, 
greenhouse gas emissions and environmental impact, under New Zealand conditions, even 
allowing for differences in the materials and manufacturing methods used.2 We can look 
at these benefits separately, starting with greenhouse gases and climate change.  
 
Transport emissions are a major source of anthropogenic greenhouse gases, 23 per cent of 
global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions.
3 The transport sector, which is mostly motor 
vehicles, is a large one and in many countries its emissions are growing rapidly. The use 
of EVs will generally displace the use of ICVs that produce GHG emissions; but the value 
of the displacement depends on how the electricity fuel is produced. For the OECD as a 
whole, the proportion of renewables in electricity production is 22 per cent; Australia 
14.9, the United States 12.9, California 24, and Germany 32.4.4 (Happily in Germany and 
California the proportion is increasing.) Some countries have a high proportion of 
renewable generation, making them prime candidates for switching to EVs. Iceland has 
100.0 percent renewables, Norway 97.7, and New Zealand 79.1. Carbon emissions of 
battery EVs using European grid-mix electricity are about half of average European 
vehicle emissions.5 The climate benefits of EVs could increase dramatically over time, 
from over 125 million tons CO2 per year in 2030 to over 1.5 billion tons CO2 per year in 
                                                          
2 Arup and Verdant Vision, Life Cycle Assessment of Electric Vehicles (Energy Efficiency and Conservation 
Authority, 2015).  
3 J D Miller and C Façanha, The State of Clean Transport Policy: A 2014 Synthesis of Vehicle and Fuel 
Policy Developments (International Council on Clean Transportation [ICCT], 2014) p 6. 
4 International Energy Agency (IEA), Renewables Information (2015), Table 3, OECD: Share of electricity 
production from renewable sources (%), 2014 provisional figures; and 
https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/themen/klima-energie/erneuerbare-energien/erneuerbare-energien-in-
zahlen (retrieved on 9 July 2016). 
5 P Wolfram and N Lutsey, Electric Vehicles: Literature Review of Technology Costs and Carbon Emissions 
(ICCT Working Paper 2016-14, 2016). EVs may have significant but manageable effects on electricity 
systems, especially if time of charging can be controlled: for example, see New Zealand Centre for 
Advanced Engineering, “Electric Vehicles: Impacts on New Zealand’s Electricity System” (Technical 




2050.6 EVs allows the global fleet to achieve approximately 40 per cent lower carbon 
emissions than a highly efficient ICV fleet (and 70 per cent lower carbon than a business-
as-usual fleet) in 2050. The greatest EV climate benefits will first be reaped in Europe and 
parts of the United States, but in the longer term in China and other emerging markets.  
 
Energy efficiency is directly linked to climate change mitigation, but has numerous 
advantages of its own, in reducing energy costs and reducing the adverse effects of energy 
supply activities and infrastructure. EVs are about four times as efficient as conventional 
ICVs at using the energy delivered to the vehicle to overcome vehicle road load.7 EVs also 
generally improve energy security, because they shift from petroleum to electricity, which 
in most countries is produced more locally, is less subject to currency fluctuations, and is 
more stable in price. For many people, EVs represent a very welcome cushioning from the 
volatility of oil prices and currencies. 
 
Air pollution from motor vehicles is another problem; it causes premature mortality, extra 
hospital admissions, and restricted activity. In New Zealand, its estimated annual total 
social cost is NZD 942 million, about NZD 214 per person.8 It is estimated that in the 
United States road transportation emissions in 2005 caused 52,800 early deaths due to 
increased PM2.5 exposure and 5,250 due to increased ozone exposure.
9 Traffic noise also 
has long-term effects on well-being and health; exposure can lead to high blood pressure, 
various types of heart disease, disturbed sleep and lower cognitive functioning.10  
 
However the air quality benefits of switching to EVs will depend on the general quality of 
a nation’s vehicle fleet and what an EV replaces. For example, in respect of particulate 
emissions from vehicles, EVs may be no better than well-regulated modern passenger 
ICVs, because non-exhaust sources (ie wear of tyres, brakes and roads, and resuspension 
of road dust) account nearly all the particulate matter produced by the car; and because 
heavier cars produce more of these emissions, and EVs are about 24% heavier than their 
ICV equivalents.11  
 
In truth, EVs do not solve all problems. EVs are still motor vehicles. They need highways 
and cause congestion, so promoting them will not reduce travel times or solve problems of 
                                                          
6 N Lutsey, Global Climate Change Mitigation Potential from a Transition to Electric Vehicles (ICCT 
Working Paper 2015-5, 2015). 
7 N Lutsey, Transition to a Global Zero-Emission Vehicle Fleet: A Collaborative Agenda for Governments 
(ICCT, 2015) p 7.  
8 G Kuschel et al, Updated Health and Air Pollution in New Zealand Study, Vol 1: Summary Report (2012) 
pp iv-v.  
9 S Barrett, R Speth, S Eastham, I Dedoussi, A Ashok, R Malina and D Keith, “Impact of the Volkswagen 
Emissions Control Defeat Device on US Public Health” (2015) 10 Environmental Research Letters 11405. 
The authors note the range of estimates from different assessment approaches.  
10 L den Boer and A Schroten, Traffic Noise Reduction in Europe: Health Effects, Social Costs and 
Technical and Policy Options to Reduce Road and Rail Traffic Noise (CE Delft, Delft, 2007) estimate the 
social costs of traffic noise in the EU to be at least €40 billion per year. 
11 V Timmers and P Achten, “Non-exhaust PM Emissions from Electric Vehicles” (2016) 134 Atmospheric 
Environment 10. Their review shows that 90% of PM10 and 85% of PM2.5 come from non-exhaust sources; 
and that EVs are approximately 24% heavier than ICV equivalents. Note that particulate emissions from 
vehicles do not include GHGs or other gases, and do not include emissions from the fuel supply system such 




urban form. They may compete with public transport for policy effort and public funds, 
and perpetuate old transport practices.12 One recent study suggests that the overall external 
costs of EVs in Germany are little better than those of ICVs if one includes the costs of 
accidents, air pollution, climate change, noise, and congestion.13 The advantages are 
argued to depend strongly on the electricity generation portfolio and potentially the 
charging strategy.14 A valuable framework for thinking about transport policy and the 
place of EVs in it is ‘avoid, shift, and improve’ putting an emphasis first on ‘avoid’ policy 
to slow travel growth, such as through city planning, ‘shift’ which moves travel to more 
energy efficient modes such as public transport, active transport (walking and cycling), 
and ‘improve’ reducing the energy consumption and emissions of all travel modes.15 EVs 
only address ‘improve.’ Electricity as a fuel has adverse effects on the environment even 




Barriers to the uptake of electric vehicles  
 
In spite of their advantages, on a global scale not many EVs are being bought. The total 
global passenger EV fleet in 2015 was estimated at 1,200,000 vehicles, out of a total fleet 
of 1,200,000,000 vehicles; one light vehicle in a thousand.16 A target of 20 million EVs by 
2020 set by the Electric Vehicles Initiative looks unreachable,17 and various government 
targets aggregating 30 million EVs by 2025 is equally unrealistic.18 The market share of 
EVs in sales has reached one per cent only in Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the 
United States. Norway stands out at over 20 per cent, and, in the US, California at 4 per 
cent.19 However growth will happen; Lutsey estimates that even allowing for supply 
constraints the market share of EVs could reach 10 to 15 per cent of sales in leading 
markets by 2025.20 EVs may gradually become common without policy action, as 
technology and prices improve, but there is a distinct public benefit in making the 
transition more rapidly, especially when there is real urgency about reducing GHG 
emissions.  
 
Why is the uptake of EVs slow? In general the main barriers for the introduction of EVs as 
a mass market product today are as follows. 
 
                                                          
12 D Rees, ‘Could Electric Cars be Bad for the Environment?’ blog post 5 November 2014, 
www.energycultures.org.nz.  
13 P Jochem, C Doll and W Fichtner, “External Costs of Electric Vehicles” (2016) 42 Transportation 
Research Part D 60. 
14 A Abdul-Manan, “Uncertainty and Differences in GHG Emissions between Electric and Conventional 
Gasoline Vehicles with Implications for Transport Policy Making” (2015) 87 Energy Policy 1. 
15 IEA, Energy Efficiency Market Report 2014, p 60, citing Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit, ‘Sustainable Urban Transport: Avoid-Shift-Improve (A-S-I)’ (Eschborn, 2004).  
16 Wolfram and Lutsey, above n 5. The figures exclude buses and two-wheeled vehicles.  
17 IEA, Global EV Outlook 2015.  
18 Lutsey, Global Climate Change, above n 6. 
19 Miller and Façanha, above n 3 p 26; ‘Norway to Review Electric Car Subsidies as Sales Soar’ Reuters, 20 
April 2015. 




(i) The higher capital cost of EVs in comparison with ICVs.21 This is an obstacle 
even though costs are coming down, and even though the total cost of 
ownership over the lifetime of the vehicle is often less than that of an ICV.22 
Furthermore, advances in the fuel efficiency of ICVs reduce relative 
attractiveness of EVs.23  
 
(ii) The shorter driving range of an EV in combination with times required to 
charge the vehicle,24 although in fact the great majority of daily car trips are 
well within EV driving ranges.25 
 
(iii) The need for a better-developed charging infrastructure.26 
 
(iv) The incomplete internalization of the negative external effects of ICVs by 
policy action. Without effective action on the GHG emissions and air pollution 
caused by ICVs, in the form of price measures or regulatory requirements, the 
comparative benefits of EVs are insufficiently valued.  
 
Element Energy Ltd’s thorough British study determined the barriers to EV uptake in 
similar terms:27 
o EVs have a high price premium over non-EVs. 
o Supply of EV models is limited, in terms of vehicle segments and brands. 
o Consumers are concerned by the short range and long charging times of EVs. 
o The majority of private vehicle buyers are not currently receptive to EVs. 
 
Other reasons may be minor in their impact but they may accumulate in public thinking; 
concerns about safety, standardization of charging systems, maintenance, and retention of 
                                                          
21 Lutsey, Transition above n 7 p 9 cites a cost differential of US $8,000-$16,000. This is consistent with the 
National Research Council, above n 1, p 112) and European findings of a net difference for mid-sized cars 
of €18,000: F Kley, M Wietschel, and D Dallinger, ‘Evaluation of European Electric Vehicle Support 
Schemes’ p 75 in M Nilsson, K Hillman, A Rickne and T Magnusson, eds, Paving the Road to Sustainable 
Transport (2012). Wolfram and Lutsey, above n 5 estimate that power train costs for PHEVs will drop about 
50%, for battery EVs 60%, and 70% for hydrogen fuel cell EVs.  
22 Battery costs, which can be half of an EV’s cost, have dropped from US $900/kWh in 2007 to $380, and 
still dropping: S Nyquist, ‘Peering into Energy’s Crystal Ball’ McKinsey Quarterly July 2015. Wolfram and 
Lutsey above n 5 estimate them to be €250/kWh in 2015 and likely to drop to €130-€180 in 2020-2025. The 
National Research Council, above n 1 p 113, concludes that the decline in EV production costs is likely to 
occur gradually, and may not be sufficient by itself to ensure widespread adoption of EVs.  
23 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Ltd, Unplugged: Electric Vehicle Realities Versus Consumer Expectations 
(2011) available www.deloitte.com, p. 16. 
24 An international survey shows that the vast majority of consumers expect EVs to recharge in less than two 
hours. 37% of the Japanese consumers saw a maximum of 30 minutes charging time as acceptable: Deloitte, 
above n 23 p 8. However such responses are likely to be strongly affected by the framing of the question.  
25 IEA / Electric Vehicles Initiative, Global EV Outlook (2013) p 26. See also National Research Council 
above n 1 p 2; Deloitte, above n 22 p 6.  
26 IEA, Global EV Outlook above n 25 p 25; J Perdiguero and J L Jiménez, ‘Policy Options for the 
Promotion of Electric Vehicles: a Review’ (Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública, 
2012) p 7 et seq.; S Lemon and A Miller, Electric Vehicles in New Zealand: From Passenger to Driver? 
(Christchurch: Electric Power Engineering Centre, 2013) p 5. 
27 Element Energy, Pathways to High Penetration of Electric Vehicles (Report for Committee on Climate 
Change, 2013) p 21; S Steinhilber, P Wells and S Thankappan, ‘Socio-Technical Inertia: Understanding the 




value. We proceed to examine the policies that different jurisdictions have adopted in 





We will examine the EV policies of Norway, California, Germany, New Zealand, 
Australia and France, selected for their usefulness as examples and in light of the authors’ 
expertise. Norway has the world’s highest percentage of EVs in its fleet and has a high 
percentage of renewable production of electricity. California has a long history of 
effective policies to tackle traffic and pollution problems and then climate change. 
Germany and France have set a strong policy direction to decarbonize their transport 
systems, with different levels of success, and at the same time are major car 
manufacturers. Australia and New Zealand are smaller countries, one of them generating 
most of its electricity from coal, the other like Norway mostly from renewables; but 





Norway’s EV history began in the 1970s when prototypes of EVs and propulsion systems 
were developed by private enterprise with financial support from the Research Council of 
Norway.28 The first vehicles were tested and the first EV incentives were introduced in the 
1990s. From 1999 to 2009 EV car production in Norway (‘Kewet’) and a Norwegian EV 
industry cluster evolved. In 2009 the government organization Transnova was established 
to support testing and demonstration of new technologies that could reduce GHG 
emissions from the transport sector. Transnova gave financial assistance to establish 
charging stations on a wide scale and to start test and demonstration facilities. Transnova 
also supported ‘Grønn bil’ an organization promoting EV usage in municipalities and 
fleets. After having reached 0.4 per cent of the total fleet of passenger vehicles 
(approximately 10,000 vehicles) in 2012, the number of EVs passed 50,000 in April 2015, 
with EVs being one-fifth of all sales.29 
Norway’s central government presently supports EVs with the following measures.30  
o ‘EL’ number plates for privileges like using bus lanes and for awareness generally.  
o Exemption from the initial vehicle registration tax. EVs do not pay this initial fee 
anyway (unless they are heavy ones) because the computation of the tax takes 
account of weight, combustion engine power, and CO2 and NOX emissions.  
o Exemption from VAT tax (usually 25 per cent) on the purchase of an EV.  
o Lowest fee band for the annual licence. 
o Fringe benefit tax (on employee benefits) half the usual rate. 
o Slightly higher mileage allowance where one is payable by an employer.  
 
                                                          
28 E Figenbaum and E Kolbenstvedt, Electromobility in Norway: Experiences and Opportunities with 
Electric Vehicles (Oslo, Institute of Transport Economics, TØI Report 1281/2013, 2013) p I to III; U Tietge, 
P Mock, N Lutsey and A Campestrini, Comparison of Leading Electric Vehicle Policy and Deployment in 
Europe (ICCT white paper, 2016) p 47.  
29 Lutsey, Transition, above n 7 p 12; ‘Norway to Review Electric Car Subsidies as Sales Soar’ Reuters, 20 
April 2015.  




While some of these measures, like the exemption from the initial vehicle registration tax, 
can be characterized as the absence of an environmental charge, others, especially the 
VAT and fringe benefit tax measures, are clearly subsidies for purchasers. In addition 
there is a range of local incentives, such as access to bus lanes, road toll exemption, free 
road ferry tickets, and free parking. The incentives that are thought to have been most 
effective are the VAT exemption, access to bus lanes, and free use of toll roads and 
ferries.31 High petrol and diesel prices also play their part. 
 
Norway has set more stringent GHG emission standards for vehicles than the EU. The 
present objective for new passenger vehicles is that the average CO2 emissions from new 
cars will be reduced to 85 g/km by 2020.32 EVs and hydrogen vehicles are identified for 
special attention, but some of the policy measures, such as the initial vehicle registration 
tax, and high petrol and diesel prices, benefit ultra-efficient ICVs as well as EVs. Most 
recently the government has been considering amendments to the car tax system to base it 
more on emissions levels rather than engine power.33 This leading jurisdiction has 
therefore set EV policy as a part of climate and transport policy.  
 
A recent Norwegian survey showed that reduction of the EV purchase price is the 
strongest incentive, but there are distinct groups of owners to whom other incentives 
matter, especially priority of access to bus lanes.34 Geographical, age, gender and 
education distinctions can be discerned in the groups, but income levels do not predict 
which incentive is most powerful, perhaps because price incentives are strong enough to 
make EVs an alternative to ICVs almost regardless of budget. Interestingly, the study 
reports intense political debate about removing EV access to bus lanes because it delays 
public transport. This may be a sign of social tensions to come in transport, calling for 
great care to prevent EV policy from appearing to favour the well-to-do early adopters of 





California has long exercised leadership in the United States on air pollution and GHG 
emissions from motor vehicles, and on energy policy generally. EVs are no exception, 
generally under the rubric of zero emissions vehicles (ZEVs) which refrains from making 
choices between different technologies. The Air Resources Board has worked on ZEV 
since 1990, and in 2010 it required manufacturers to sell an increasing percentage of ZEVs 
in California, 14 per cent for model years 2015 to 2017.35 This use of direct regulation to 
mandate EVs may be unique. The ‘Transit Fleet Rule’ requires bus operators to reduce 
pollution and GHG emissions. The 2013 ZEV Action Plan identified actions that different 
agencies would take to complete necessary infrastructure, improve consumer awareness 
and demand, and increase fleet uptake, in order to reach a target of 1,500,000 ZEVs by 
                                                          
31 Figenbaum and Kolbenstvedt, above n 28 p. VII, Table S. 1. 
32 Figenbaum and Kolbenstvedt, above n 28 p 23; Tietge et al above n 28 p 7.  
33 H Stolen, ‘Volkswagen Scandal may Lead to Rethink of Norway’s New Car Tax’ (Reuters, 29 September 
2015).  
34 K Bjerkan, T Nørbech, M Nordtømme, “Incentives for Promoting Battery Electric Vehicle (BEV) 
Adoption in Norway” (2016) 43 Transportation Research Part D 169. 




2025.36 Fiscal incentives (up to $2,500 for EVs, $5,000 for fuel cell vehicles), carpool lane 
access and extensive charging infrastructure development have also played their part. Five 
out of the top seven EV-deployment cities in the United States are in California or states 
that have adopted the ZEV program.37 
 
What is striking about these California ZEV initiatives, apart from their ambition, is how 
they fit within a very comprehensive energy policy framework. The centrepiece is the 
Integrated Energy Policy Report, a statutory responsibility of the California Energy 
Commission since 2002. Its 2014 version focuses on transportation and its role in meeting 
state climate, air quality and energy goals.38 An important part of the policy work that it 
coordinates is the Alternative and Renewable Fuel and Vehicle Technology Program, 
funded with up to $100 million annually. The Low Carbon Fuel Standard began in 2011. 
For decades, the Air Resources Board has exerted strong pressure on motor vehicle 
pollution, and from 2004 its standards have controlled GHG emissions as well. The Board 
is responsible for the Cap-and-Trade Program under the California Global Warming 
Solutions Act of 2006,39 which was launched in 2013, and which included transportation 
fuels in 2015. The 2006 Act sets an ambitious target of limiting California’s GHG 
emissions at 1990 levels by 2020, and requires continuing reductions beyond then.  
 
The vehicle fleet of California is also affected by federal laws and policies. The EV 
Everywhere Grand Challenge of 2012 focuses on cutting battery costs, cutting drive 
system costs, and reducing vehicle weight.40 It includes expenditure on charging 
infrastructure and education. The goal is by 2022 to produce EVs that are as affordable as 
today’s ICVs. The most significant federal measure for EVs is a federal income tax credit 
for purchasers of EVs, ranging between $2,500 and $7,500 depending on battery size, and 
restricted to the first 200,000 vehicles sold by each manufacturer in the United States.41 
However the credit is not refundable, so it is little benefit to people who have low tax 
liabilities.42 The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which put the credit 
in place instead of one that also benefited hybrid vehicles, also authorises substantial EV 
loans, grants and tax credits to the automobile industry.  
 
Just as in California state law and policy, these federal policies and provisions that address 
EVs directly must be seen in the broader policy context of transport, climate, and 
pollution. The most important feature is fuel and GHG efficiency standards. The corporate 
average fleet efficiency (CAFE) standards have improved energy efficiency to reduce 
                                                          
36 Available www.opr.ca.gov. See Miller and Façanha, above n 3, p 27.  
37 N Lutsey, S Searle, S Chambliss, and A Bandivadekar, Assessment of Leading Electric Vehicle Promotion 
Activities in United States Cities (ICCT white paper, 2015) p 41.  
38 California Energy Commission, Integrated Energy Policy Report: 2014 IEPR Update (Publication CEC-
100-2014-001-CMF, 2015). 
39 California Health and Safety Code § 38500 et al (AB 32, 2006), 17 CCR § 95801. 
40 US Department of Energy, EV Everywhere: Grand Challenge Blueprint (2013).  
41 26 USC § 30D; Congressional Budget Office, Effects of Federal Tax Credits for the Purchase of Electric 
Vehicles (Washington, September 2012) p 3. 
42 The Congressional Budget Office, above n 41 p 25, estimated that for 2011 only about 20% of potential 
tax filers had a tax liability of at least $7,500 (the maximum EV credit) and only about 40% had a liability of 




dependence on foreign oil, and have mitigated local air pollution since the 1970s.43 The 
standards are imposed on manufacturers and importers, in respect of the average 
performance of all the regulated vehicles that they manufacture for sale in the United 
States in a year. That gives them flexibility and the ability to sell inefficient vehicles as 
well as efficient ones. The standards under the Energy Policy Conservation Act initially 
covered passenger cars but not minivans, pickup trucks and sports utility vehicles, sales of 
which boomed in the 1980s; those vehicles were only brought under the regulations under 
an ‘attribute based’ system in 2009. The agencies set standards for different classes of 
vehicle for each model year eighteen months in advance. After much struggle, including 
the court case Massachusetts v Environmental Protection Agency,44 the system was 
extended to GHG emissions. In 2012 a national standard was agreed to simplify the 
carmakers’ duties under the Clean Air Act emissions controls, the CAFE standards, and 
California’s GHG controls, but with progressively more ambitious targets.45  
 
An emissions control defeat device was discovered by the EPA and the California Air 
Resources Board in Volkswagen diesel engine models 2009-2015. The electronic control 
software produced real-world nitrogen oxides (NOx) emissions 10 to 40 times above the 
compliance levels achieved under test conditions. While it was not the first time a car 
manufacturer had resorted to illegal deception, the Volkswagen case was a major 
challenge to American and European pollution laws, and in itself had a significant impact 
on public health.46 It is likely to result in tougher monitoring, better testing methods that 
reflect on-road results, and more pressure on diesel technology – all of which are likely to 





Action in Germany to promote EVs proceeds against the background of the effective 
regulation of GHG emissions in the European Union. CO2 emission standards for motor 
vehicles were introduced in 2007, have become steadily more stringent, and put 
significant pressure on the quality of the ICV fleet.47 (CO2 emissions are directly related to 
fuel efficiency.) Further strengthening of the standards has been decided on, coming into 
effect in 2020. Relatively high fuel prices also play their part.48 However the stringent 
European CO2 controls have led to more reliance on diesel engines with their particulate 
and NOx
 problems.49  
 
                                                          
43 42 USC § 32902 et seq, 49 CFR § 501 et seq; J S Martel and K K White, ‘Motor Vehicles and 
Transportation’ ch 14 p 325 in M B Gerrard, ed, Law of Clean Energy (American Bar Association, 2011). 
44 549 US 497 (2007); J Freeman, ‘The Obama Administration’s National Auto Policy: Lessons from the 
“Car Deal”’ (2011) 35 Harvard Env L Rev 343. 
45 OECD, Climate Change Mitigation Policies and Progress (2015) p 76. 
46 Barrett Speth et al, above n 9.  
47 EU standards are described below under the heading Efficiency Standards: Fuel Efficiency or GHG 
Emissions Regulation.  
48 Lutsey, Transitions, above n 7 p 13.  
49 C Schmidt, “Beyond a One-Time Scandal: Europe’s Ongoing Diesel Pollution Problem” (2016) 124 




In 2009, Germany took action on EVs more specifically by adopting the National 
Electromobility Development Plan which set a goal of becoming a lead market and lead 
manufacturer, with the goal of 1,000,000 electric vehicles on the road by 2020.50 The 
important Energy Concept policy statement of 2010 added a goal of 6,000,000 vehicles by 
2030.51 The Electromobility Plan established the National Platform for Electromobility 
(NPE) with experts from industry, science and society in seven working groups, on drive 
technologies and vehicle integration, battery technology, charging infrastructure and 
power grid integration, regulation, standardization and certification, materials and 
recycling, training and qualifications, and general framework.52 The results from these 
working groups were brought together in a ‘systemic approach.’ It addresses Vehicle 
Technology, Energy and Environment, Charging Infrastructure and Urban Planning as 
well as Intermodality. In addition, education, standards and information and 
communication technology are seen as crucial preconditions for the system. The NPE’s 
specific vision is formulated as to create a robust ‘electric mobility system’ until 2020 that 
enjoys widespread public acceptance, guarantees high availability, reliably meets 
individual mobility needs (private and commercial transport) and facilitates the marketing 
of technologically sophisticated and profitable products.53 The country has placed more 
focus on research and development and public-private partnerships and less on per-vehicle 
consumer incentives.54  
 
Since April 2012 the ‘systemic approach’ on the federal level has been accompanied by 
four testing regions as showcases for electric mobility within the federal states of Baden-
Württemberg, Berlin/Brandenburg, Lower Saxony, and Bavaria.55 In 2014, 90 projects 
combining a total of 334 individual initiatives were funded in the showcase regions, the 
Federal Government contributing €157 million.56 The approach emphasizes testing and 
demonstrating electric mobility in everyday life, with a special focus on linking EVs and 
the electricity system by using information and communication technology in the transport 
system.57 
 
Currently the following legal incentives for EVs are in force in Germany. 
                                                          
50 ‘Nationaler Entwicklungsplan Elektromobilität der Bundesregierung’ (1.8.2009) available in English 
http://www.bmub.bund.de/. Generally see Tietge et al above n 28 p 10.  
51 Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi), Energy Concept (2010 with amendment in 
2011) available in English www.germany.info p 24. 
52 ‘Nationale Plattform Elektromobilität’ (NPE) available www.bmub.bund.de (retrieved 17.4.2015) and 
‘Vision and Roadmap of the National Electric Mobility Platform’ September 2012, available www.bmwi.de 
(retrieved 17.4.2015). 
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o EVs are exempted from the motor vehicle tax for ten years when licensed before 
the end of 2015 and for five years when licensed from 2016 until the end of 
2020.58 
o This exemption is accompanied by a fifty percent tax reduction on the purchase 
price for all EVs.59 
o The Federal Ordinance on the licensing of motor vehicles allows interchangeable 
licence plates for ICVs and EVs, among other vehicles. This instrument is intended 
to facilitate the ownership of an EV as second vehicle.60 
o Electricity used in public transport is subject to an electricity tax reduction.61 
o Due to changes within the Energy Law framework in 2016, operators of charging 
points are no longer to be considered as energy suppliers but rather as final 
consumers not having to face energy suppliers’ tax obligations.62 
o Furthermore, the German government recently introduced a moderate fiscal 
incentive of €2,000 when buying a pure EV and of €1,500 when purchasing a 
hybrid EV.63 
 
A new Electromobility Act was enacted in June 2015.64 It authorizes municipalities to 
grant privileges to EVs (and hybrid and fuel-cell vehicles) for parking and bus lanes, and 
for those vehicles to be specially identified in their registration numbers. In addition, a 
draft Ordinance on Charging Infrastructure was presented in October 2015.65 Its objective 
is to harmonize charging infrastructure standards in Germany to grant national and 
European interoperability according to recent European legislation.66 The operators of 
public charging infrastructure will be obliged to report the start and finish of infrastructure 
operations to the Federal Network Agency.  
 
In September 2016 Germany’s Federal Council sent a note to the European Council with 
regard to a strategy to move towards “low emission mobility”.67 The press coverage 
particularly concentrated on the intention to make use of fiscal instruments within the EU 
so that by 2030 only zero emissions vehicles would be registered. Nevertheless, the recent 
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legislation and policy measures do not foresee major subsidies or economically relevant 
direct aid for EV purchasers, and that is thought to be the reason for the small uptake of 
EVs – only 24,000 vehicles reported at the end of 201468 – even though recently the 





Road transport GHG emissions in New Zealand have grown three times as fast as overall 
national emissions.70 The country’s population density is low and the use of public 
transport in major cities is low by international standards. Renewable energy sources, 
especially hydro, have always dominated New Zealand’s electricity supply, and the 
proportion of renewables is approaching 80 per cent.71 Geothermal and wind energy 
account for most recent and anticipated additions to generation capacity. EVs would not 
stress this system; even if EVs were 80 per cent of the vehicles entering the fleet by 2040, 
EV charging is likely to be no more than 8 per cent of total electricity demand.72 Most 
light vehicles are parked at home overnight with access to an electrical outlet.73 Electricity 
companies are interested in EVs as a new market; fortunately, most of them already offer 
time-of-use pricing plans which may be enough to manage peak demand without 
regulation.74 EV sales are growing, but the numbers are still minute; by June 2016 the 
light electric fleet had reached 1512 vehicles, one car in 2300.75  
 
In May 2016 the Government announced an EV policy package.76 It set a target of 
doubling the number of EVs in New Zealand every year, to reach approximately 64,000 
by 2021, about two percent of the light vehicle fleet. The package announced the 
extension (to the end of 2021) of an existing exemption from the road user charges that are 
normally payable by the owners of non-petrol vehicles in order to fund road construction 
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and maintenance.77 For a typical car driver driving 14,000 km the charge is $812 per 
annum. The package also announced an extension of the exemption to heavy electric 
vehicles, until December 2025. This is unusual because bus and truck EV technology is 
generally less advanced than for light vehicles. Road controlling authorities will be able to 
allow EVs to use bus and high occupancy vehicle lanes, and to designate parking for EV 
charging points. Bulk purchasing, an information campaign, and a contestable fund for 
innovation are proposed. The package proposes a review of tax and like liabilities. The 
fringe benefit tax is calculated on a vehicle’s cost price or market value,78 so it probably 
over-taxes EVs that have a higher initial price and lower lifetime cost. 
 
The package made no announcement about introducing fuel efficiency standards. A 
proposal for such standards was considered in 2008, but was dropped after a change of 
government.79 However standards may be considered in the revision of the National 
Energy Efficiency and Conservation Strategy under the Energy Efficiency and 
Conservation Act 2000. At least under that Act there exists a public awareness measure in 
the Energy Efficiency (Vehicle Fuel Economy Labelling) Regulations 2007.  
 
As for motor vehicle air pollution, regulation under the Land Transport Act 1988 follows 
the Australian Design Rules, which mainly follow the European Union’s regulations with 
a lag of four or five years.80 On the whole, Australia and New Zealand’s vehicle exhaust 
emission rules are aligned with other OECD countries.81 
 
Overall, the hope for exponential growth in New Zealand EV numbers is ambitious, and 
the policy measures are not particularly forceful. The electricity generation mix makes 
EVs an attractive proposition, and electricity companies are in a position to exploit market 
opportunities. The private sector is installing a network of high-speed charging stations 
well ahead of demand, and work such as bulk purchasing to increase customer choice and 
reduce prices is likely to have some effect. How rapidly the mass market will change is 
unclear. The turnover of cars in New Zealand is unusually slow; the average age of the 
light vehicle fleet is 14.2 years, and many vehicles are imported as used cars, from Japan 
in particular.82 Even though potential purchasers in New Zealand feel more positive about 
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Light vehicle GHG emissions have been Australia’s fastest-growing emissions, up 47.5 
per cent since 1990.84 The uptake of EVs has been slow; sales in 2014 were 948 out of 
1.08 million new vehicles sold. There is no national policy framework, but there has been 
some state and local support for charging infrastructure, free charging, and modest 
registration discounts.85 ClimateWorks proposes a series of policy measures to ensure that 
the benefits of EVs are recognized, and that EVs are encouraged with awareness 
measures, upfront purchase incentives and operating incentives like access to priority 
lanes. Barriers to EVs can be removed, notably the fringe benefit tax (as in New Zealand) 
and the luxury car tax that penalizes expensive cars.  
 
Australia has had vehicle air pollution rules in place since the 1970s.86 As noted above, the 
Australian Design Rules track those of Europe.  
 
The absence of vehicle fuel efficiency standards is an important part of the background. 
Australia, along with New Zealand, is one of the few developed countries not to have such 
standards in place. They are particularly important in a state such as Victoria, where most 
electricity is generated from brown coal and where EVs may have worse overall emissions 
than ICVs for some time to come.87 There is a voluntary scheme, but without regulation 
the average CO2 emissions of new Australian cars is 45 per cent worse than European 
requirements.88 The federal government decided against compulsory light vehicle 
emission standards in 2014,89 even though fuel efficiency presented the lowest cost 
opportunity to reduce emissions across the economy, and average car owners would 
recover the additional costs within three years through fuel savings.90  
 
However in February 2016 the government established a Ministerial Forum on Vehicle 
Emissions to revisit emissions standards and consider the options.91 Later in 2016 the 
Climate Change Authority recommended that carbon dioxide emissions standards be 
introduced for light vehicles and considered for heavy vehicles as well. It noted that 
Australia was unusual in not having such standards already.92 As to EVs, the Authority 
provided figures that show that EVs only have a modest advantage over ICVs under the 
current electricity generation mix. It observed that direct EV financial incentives would 
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likely be an expensive method of emissions reductions, and recommended research into 





France is among leaders in Europe for EV sales.93 The government adopted a 14-point 
plan for EVs in 2009.94 It included policies and incentives to install seven million charging 
points (public and private) by 2030. Policy is now embodied in the general framework of 
the Energy Transition for Green Growth Law of 2015.95 It requires half of all new national 
government vehicle purchases to be low-emissions vehicles, and 20 per cent of local 
government vehicles. Research and development by car manufacturers was supported.  
 
The most notable policy measure is the bonus-malus or feebate scheme that applies to 
initial vehicle registrations. The fee side ranges from €150 to €8,000, and the rebate from 
€150 to €6,300.96 Battery EVs qualify for the highest bonus of €6,300 and plug-in hybrids 
for €4,000. A motor vehicle dealer can advance the bonus to reduce the purchase price 
directly. Annual vehicle ownership taxes are also determined by the vehicle’s CO2 
emission value, and EVs are exempt from company car tax for the first two years.97 The 
benefits of the bonus-malus scheme are enhanced if a car buyer also scraps a diesel car 
registered before 2001; he or she can reap a total benefit of €10,000.98  
 
The bonus-malus scheme produced an immediate reduction in France of 6 per cent in CO2 
emissions in new cars, almost twice that in the rest of the EU, and significant reductions 
have continued. There is evidence that the bonus-malus scheme is less vulnerable to 
gaming for tax purposes than an emissions standard system.99 The scheme is effective in 
promoting EVs. Its parameters are periodically updated. We consider bonus-malus or 
feebate schemes further below as an example that other countries could follow. 
 
 
The different policy options for electric vehicles 
 
On the basis of these examinations of the EV policies of different countries, it is possible 
to turn to consider different policy instruments in turn. There is a growing body of studies 
from around the globe that assess the effectiveness of government policies on EVs. They 
tell a strong and consistent story about the barriers to EV uptake and the success of policy 
measures to overcome them. In a recent literature review, Nic Lutsey of the International 
Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT) identified the best-practice design principles that 
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emerge.100 The consensus he found is that, although regulatory standards for fuel 
efficiency are necessary, along with research and development, they are insufficient 
without complementary policies and incentives: 
o Fiscal incentives to defray the incremental upfront cost; non-fiscal incentives such 
as preferential road, parking and lane access to provide benefits to vehicle users. 
o Engagement with electricity utilities for EV charging rates and infrastructure; 
utility involvement in EV financing and vehicle-to-grid technology. 
o Deployment of public and workplace charging networks 
o Placement of EVs in car-sharing fleets, and encouragement of longer-range EVs. 
o Information and awareness actions. 
 
Similarly, Element Energy Ltd, in a study for Britain’s Committee on Climate Change, 
concluded that a high uptake of EVs requires:101 
o Continuing and sustained improvements in the supply of EV models, with tighter 
CO2 emissions standards as the decisive driver for supply;  
o Consumer awareness and acceptance; 
o Charging infrastructure promoted as to household units, and in the longer term a 
national network of public charging points; and  
o A level of equivalent value support (financial or otherwise) in the order of £2,500 
per EV, for 2020-2030.  
 
Likewise, the International Energy Agency (IEA) considers that the keys to global EV 
growth are: 
o lowering the initial vehicle cost,  
o developing electricity storage and fuelling technologies, and  
o co-ordinating infrastructure investment.102  
 
A detailed study of European EV policies comes to similar conclusions.103 One can also 
draw on a statistical analysis of American cities which shows that EV uptake is strongly 
correlated with charging infrastructure, incentives, and city-level actions, but with 
significant variations and uncertainties; in Los Angeles, carpool or bus lane access seems 
important; in Portland, charging infrastructure seems key; while in Atlanta, subsidies are 
dominant.104 Another literature review of American policy measures emphasizes that EV 
adoption is greatest when multiple measures are used in parallel, that measures to reduce 
the upfront cost help EV uptake, and that other support such as emission testing 
exemptions, low-carbon fuel policies and awareness actions are important.105 Charging 
infrastructure and a good availability of EV models are also significant.  
 
This international research and experience shows consistency about the policy priorities. 
We can proceed to consider the main policy options in greater depth.  
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Price support to address the cost of electric vehicles 
 
As we have seen in different countries, price support, fiscal incentives, or subsidies are 
generally regarded as important to produce any significant uptake of EVs, in order to deal 
with the price barrier. Price measures can be justified on economic grounds to correct for 
the negative externalities of ICVs.106 In theory taxes on fuels and prices on carbon might 
be more efficient but in fact the upfront purchase price of a vehicle weighs heavily on 
consumer choices. Because the capital cost premium is the most significant restraint on 
mass EV adoption, financial incentives or value support are effective and essential.107 In 
some countries large fiscal incentives have been offered. Norway offered €11,500 per 
battery EV (about 55 per cent of the vehicle base price), and the Netherlands €38,000 for a 
large company-owned plug-in hybrid EV (about 75 per cent).108 Unsurprisingly those 
massive incentives led to rapid growth in the EV share in vehicle sales, nearly 6 per cent 
and nearly 5 per cent respectively. California shows a major response too. More 
surprisingly, in Sweden and the United Kingdom, with incentives of 35 per cent and 50 
per cent of vehicle base price respectively, EV sales barely budged from zero. Germany, 
as we have seen, has only moderate fiscal incentives and has also seen much less EV 
growth than other leading countries in the past. Mock and Yang conclude that fiscal 
incentives are powerful mechanisms, but are not the only factor that influence EV market 
growth. 
 
A number of studies show convincingly that EV price support or incentive measures need 
to be well designed in order to produce results.109 First, they need to be big enough to 
make a difference; small subsidies will benefit purchasers but will not change their 
behaviour. Secondly, incentives need to be available immediately at the time of sale; 
consumers have a short pay-back outlook on the investment. (For example, sales tax 
waivers work much better than income tax credits.110) Thirdly, incentives need to be in 
place for long enough to send a clear message to automakers and importers. Fourthly, 
incentives should be linked to the relevant externality, such as the vehicle’s CO2 
emissions, and should apply to the entire vehicle fleet and not only to EVs; conventional 
ICVs cannot be put to one side. Purchase incentives should be stronger for battery EVs 
than for plug-in hybrids, and stronger where an EV purchase is linked to the retirement of 
an old vehicle.111 Ideally price incentives should be in place both at the time of purchase 
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and throughout a vehicle’s lifetime.112 Fifthly, price incentives need to be used in 
combination with other policy instruments, as well as embracing a wide variety of 
technologies.113  
 
The effects of taxation also need to be taken into account.114 We have noted the delivery 
of EV subsidies through tax credits in the United States, and reductions in taxes on EVs in 
Norway and France, but we have also seen that the structure of fringe benefit taxes in 
Australia and New Zealand discourages EV purchases. The United Kingdom’s company 
car tax, which varies substantially by CO2 emissions, shows one path for reform.
115 
 
Incentives should be designed with a view to social equity and distribution; if they are 
clumsily designed they will be regressive and only help the well-to-do buy EVs.116 There 
is no point, and a good deal of harm, in allowing public funds to be disproportionately 
transferred to wealthy new car buyers who would have purchased clean vehicles anyway. 
Even apart from social equity, emission reductions will be greater if incentives reach low-
income consumers, because they tend to drive more polluting vehicles, drive them further, 
and exhibit less propensity to buy clean vehicles.117  
 
Overall, policymakers have much evidence that the question of vehicle price cannot be 
ignored, and that price support incentives are essential and effective. They also have 
cogent evidence about the design of incentives. It is likely, for example, that the American 
federal tax rebate is not as effective or fair as it should be, and it is likely that purchasers 
are not greatly motivated by New Zealand’s road user charges exemption because it does 
not provide an immediate reduction in price and is available for a limited time only. 
 
 
Efficiency standards: fuel efficiency or GHG emissions regulation 
 
EVs look like a viable option only if the adverse effects of ICVs are controlled, so we 
need to consider the regulatory pressure on all kinds of vehicle. The great majority of the 
world’s vehicle sales – eighty-five per cent – are subject to efficiency standards, whether 
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in the form of fuel efficiency, fuel economy, or GHG emissions.118 Russia, Australia and 
New Zealand are exceptions from this general pattern; even Saudi Arabia is adopting a 
standard.119 These standards have proved to be highly cost-effective in cutting CO2 
emissions and producing fuel savings. Between 2000 and 2010 they improved new vehicle 
fuel efficiency by 20 per cent in OECD countries and 10 per cent in other countries.120 
 
We have seen these standards in the laws of several jurisdictions. The American ‘CAFE’ 
standards – corporate average fuel efficiency standards – are among the pioneers, 
introduced to tackle air pollution in California but now also part of the response to climate 
change. In the European Union, the CO2 standards that were put in place for cars in 2009 
set an overall fleet average target for 2015 of 130 g/km, which accelerated reductions 
considerably; in 2006 the average was about 160 g/km.121 It is expected that the standards 
that have been agreed on to take effect in 2020 will produce a 25 per cent reduction in fuel 
consumption, and that the fuel savings will actually be larger than the cost of compliance, 
resulting in net savings of between €80 and €295 per ton of CO2 avoided. Both the 
American and European standards are very cost-effective and are credited with putting 
significant pressure on the ICV fleet.122 The regulatory pressure on ICVs makes EVs a 
more attractive option for suppliers and for purchasers.123 Efficiency standards have been 
found to be a key driver for the deployment of EVs in the United States and Europe.124  
 
However there is some complexity in the relationship between efficiency standards and 
EV uptake. One feature of efficiency standards that is crucial, but in our view 
insufficiently understood, is that they operate as averages. They require each manufacturer 
or importer for each model year to sell a fleet of vehicles that, when measured overall, 
meets the regulatory standard. The positive side of this averaging is that it gives the 
vendors flexibility to continue to offer low-efficiency vehicles, provided that they are 
balanced with high-efficiency ones. But it may reduce the power of efficiency standards to 
increase EV numbers. In Europe, although increasingly stringent CO2 regulation 
incentivizes EVs, the automakers already have dozens of ICV models that meet the 2021 
emission standard, so they do not need to produce EVs to meet it.125 Similarly in the 
United States, the Congressional Budget Office concludes that the federal tax credits for 
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the purchase of EVs may produce little or no reduction in gasoline consumption or GHG 
emissions because with CAFE standards the vehicle suppliers can match the greater EV 
sales numbers with greater numbers of low-economy vehicles.126 The inference is that 
vehicle efficiency standards may not on their own ensure the mass-market adoption of 
EVs, and, equally, that price support for EVs may not reduce GHG emissions.  
 
In turn, that presses us to ask what really matters, the GHG reductions, or the EV sales? 
We suggest that the answer is both. ICVs will be part of the vehicle fleet for a very long 
time and it all needs to be as efficient and low in emissions as possible; and that efficiency 
standards are the best means to that end. Equally, looking further ahead, we need to 
promote technology diffusion for EVs and other ultra-low emissions vehicles that will be 
required for an entirely new kind of mobility future. 
 
The averaging characteristic of efficiency standards has another consequence for countries 
like Australia and New Zealand that do not have such laws. In those countries, a car 
manufacturer can sell as many of its low-efficiency models as it likes, even though the 
sales in other countries are limited. This contrasts with absolute standards for product 
quality or performance, where one country can free-ride on the regulatory efforts of 
another. In fact very few countries are promoting EVs without fuel efficiency measures to 
shape the composition of the overall vehicle fleet.  
 
 
Price on carbon 
 
Also relevant are measures that put a price on GHG emissions, in the form of a carbon tax 
or emissions trading scheme. We have already noted arguments that conceptually carbon 
pricing and pollution pricing are more directly targeted at the negative externalities.127 
However there seems to be a good case for policy action on both vehicle purchase 
decisions and subsequent vehicle use decisions. The two activities are quite different and 
different policy instruments are needed to influence them. It is not a case of unnecessary 
duplication. There is firm evidence that carbon pricing on its own is not enough to 
overcome all barriers to cost-effective energy use actions.128  
 
A general price on carbon is used alongside vehicle efficiency standards in California, 
British Columbia and Quebec. In other cases, such as New Zealand, and carbon price 
exists but is probably too small to influence decisions; the Emissions Trading Scheme 
charge is about 2 cents per litre of fuel.129 In Europe, motor vehicle fuel is not subject to 
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Feebates are interesting as a policy instrument that can address both the price barrier and 
fuel efficiency at once. Feebates are generally recognized in the literature of 
environmental economics and policy,130 and in relation to motor vehicles the best example 
is the French bonus/malus scheme, noted above. A feebate rates each model for its GHG 
emissions or efficiency performance, usually at the point of initial import or manufacture, 
so that better vehicles get rebates and worse ones must pay fees.131 The reward is tangible 
and immediate. A true feebate is self-financing; fees received from above the ‘pivot point’ 
are balanced by the rebates paid below it. (The pivot must therefore be reset periodically 
as technology changes and as ambition grows.) Revenue neutrality is attractive politically; 
a feebate is not a subsidy or a tax. It is likely to be attractive in terms of social equity; it is 
less likely than most systems to put good quality vehicles out of the reach of poor families. 
A feebate is technology-neutral; it influences the purchase of ICVs and EVs alike, and 
encourages hybrids, fuel cells, and hydrogen vehicles as well. It will generally give EVs 
favourable ratings especially where electricity generation is low-carbon.  
 
Feebate principles can also be applied to vehicle use, such as in Germany’s annual vehicle 
registration fee, connected to engine capacity as well as CO2 emissions. In theory it sends 
a larger price signal than the French feebate, but it may have less consumer impact 
because it is spread out over time.132 The United Kingdom has a similar arrangement for 
its annual vehicle excise duty.133 The United States has a ‘gas guzzler’ tax but it applies to 
only a small fraction of the vehicle fleet.134 The feebate model seems very suitable for a 
country like New Zealand, which does not yet have fuel efficiency standards or substantial 





Among the barriers to the uptake of EVs are their short driving range in comparison with 
ICVs and the need for a better-developed charging infrastructure, even though most of the 
car trips that people make actually are well within EV driving range. Most EV charging 
can be done at the owner’s residence, using ordinary electrical outlets for a full charge 
overnight.135 However there is also a role for a network of public charging facilities that 
provide a rapid recharge. Such facilities are important for people who cannot readily 
charge at their residence, and for long-distance travellers; but they are also vital to 
displace the “range anxiety” that has been found to weigh on the decisions of potential 
purchasers.136 The practical and psychological importance of charging is suggested by an 
American study showing a correlation between the number of a city’s public chargers per 
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capita with its EV share.137 We have noticed that Portland, Oregon, is distinctive in 
achieving high EV numbers of EVs with high levels of public charger availability but low 
levels of subsidy. 
 
Whether government support is needed to develop a charging infrastructure may vary 
from place to place. California, France, Germany, Norway, and other jurisdictions have 
been active providing such support. Some municipalities, cooperatives and companies 
may promote EV car-sharing schemes such as the one in Paris.138 However in other places, 
such as New Zealand, private enterprise seems to be providing charging ahead of demand. 
There is evidence that early EV adoption does not depend on the government to provide 
large-scale access to a national public charging infrastructure.139 Where government action 
is clearly needed is legislation to give local government and other authorities the mandate 
and powers to authorize EV charging facilities on public road space. The German statute 




Public awareness and ancillary regulation 
 
Research shows that consumers and fleet managers are not well informed about EVs, and 
that a number of perceptual factors contribute to consumer uncertainty and doubt about 
them, particularly the total costs of ownership over time, battery durability, and the 
driving range concern that we have just considered.141 Educational and information 
measures are therefore essential. Fiscal incentives on their own are not sufficient to ensure 
uptake.142 On the other hand it is unlikely that public awareness measures are enough on 
their own to outweigh high EV purchase prices, limited driving range, and limited variety 
of models, especially where ICVs do not face significant regulation of fuel efficiency or 
GHG emissions.143 
 
In New Zealand the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority produced an online 
tool for fleet purchasers to compare the total cost of ownership of EVs and other vehicles. 
Large fleet procurements can spur EV sales by leading public opinion and accelerating 
economies of scale. The German government intends to replace its existing vehicle fleet 
with EVs, and the French government is coordinating the purchase of 50,000 EVs.144 The 
special number plates for EVs in Norway improve public awareness, identifying EVs and 
giving preferential rights as to bus lanes, parking, road charges and ferries. Benefits of this 
kind, mainly non-financial ‘perks,’ are likely to encourage EVs, and do not impose 
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obvious fiscal costs. They are also measures that a municipality can implement without 





Brief mention should be made of the strategy that we have noted in some countries with 
large automotive industries, investing substantially in supply-side innovation, especially 
by providing automakers with research and development funding. France, Germany and 
the United States are examples. Such countries often also put public funding into the 






It is clear that EVs offer public benefits in relation to climate change, air pollution, energy 
efficiency and energy security – even though the incidence of the benefits is not the same 
everywhere. It is also evident from the literature that policy action is essential to obtain 
any significant uptake of EVs beyond a business as usual rate. We have seen that a 
number of policy actions and legal measures have a proven track record, backed up by a 
strong consensus in the research and analysis. For example, it is very likely that the price 
barrier is not overcome by subsidies that are too small and too gradual. The literature also 
shows that non-price barriers such as information and availability are important. So too 
are unintended barriers such as road use rules that can impede the development of 
charging infrastructure. Policy actions need to be well designed, and often they need to be 
used together, working on different decision points and different aspects of human 
behaviour.  
 
Two insights emerge from this analysis that are more novel and perhaps contentious. The 
first is that EV policy and transport policy diverge at key points. Electric vehicles are still 
vehicles. They do not reduce journey times, the number of cars on the road, or the demand 
for new roading. They produce about as much particulate matter air pollution as ICVs. 
EVs themselves need to evolve, for example by making reductions in vehicle weight. If 
EVs are understood still to be vehicles, we see that public effort and resources invested in 
them may not be the best investments that society can make in transport; public transport, 
shared transport and active transport, for example, may produce better results. EV 
initiatives should find their place within the “avoid, shift, improve” framework. An undue 
focus on EVs may unduly perpetuate longstanding but outmoded conceptions of vehicle 
use and ownership. Electrification needs to find its place in relation to connected and 
autonomous vehicles – CAVs – that are likely to be EVs but with self-driving capabilities 
that may transform human mobility, and suddenly seem to be emerging as a reality.  
 
The second insight is that EV policy and climate change policy also diverge at key points. 
A switch from petroleum to electricity as a fuel will reduce GHG emissions under most 
generation mix scenarios. EV policy measures need to be coordinated with a shift towards 
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renewable energy production, carbon pricing and other GHG measures. We have seen that 
efforts to promote EVs are undercut if ICVs are not exposed to the real cost of their 
negative externalities. However the swiftest cheapest reductions in GHG emissions from 
road transport may not come from EVs, but from better ICVs, vehicles using biofuels or 
hydrogen fuel cells, or from public and active transport. We find a particular divergence in 
relation to fuel efficiency standards. Generally, fuel efficiency standards support EVs 
because they require improvements in the vehicle fleet as a whole. However, carmakers 
need not use EVs to meet the rules, and even when they do they can add equivalent 
numbers of high-emissions vehicles at the other end of the efficiency spectrum. In neither 
situation does an emphasis on EVs, such as price support, shift GHG emissions. The 
inference would be that EV subsidies are unnecessary if our concern is with GHGs and we 
have good fuel efficiency standards in place.  
 
These insights seem to bring us to the familiar policy criteria of efficiency and equity. 
Efficiency causes us to ask whether EV-specific measures, such as auto industry research 
and development support, price incentives or bus-lane privileges, are the most cost-
efficient way to obtain benefits in transport management or in GHG emission reductions. 
Whether they are good value for money in the use of public funds and resources is a 
proposition that needs to be justified. The fact that EV policy diverges from transport 
policy and climate change policy is apparent. It has often been said that policymaking 
should avoid picking winners and favouring one technology in addressing a general 
problem.147 On the other hand, as we have noted it may be desirable, even essential, to 
support the longer-term emergence of EVs as a technical option, even though it is an 
expensive one in the short term.  
 
The equity criterion seems very relevant as well; it causes us to ask whether a measure 
such as EV price support is a regressive subsidy, if it fails to change behaviour and merely 
redistributes income towards purchasers who are already affluent. Equity tensions will 
also appear dramatically if bus users complain that EV users entitled to use bus lanes are 
slowing down public transport. Social equity therefore presents a real challenge to policy 
makers.  
 
On the whole it is reasonably clear that EVs have a role in transport and greenhouse gas 
emission reductions in a sustainable society, and the sooner that they can make their 
contribution in substantial numbers, the better. It will take careful policymaking and law 
reform to ensure that they do so.  
 
 
                                                          
147 M J Trebilcock and J S F Wilson, ‘The Perils of Picking Technological Winners in Renewable Energy 
Policy’ p 343 in G Kaiser and B Heggie, eds, Energy Law and Policy (Toronto: Carswell, 2011). 
